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Introduction
Whenever the ownership and control of property are separated,
owners face the possibility that their property will be managed not
for their benefit, but for the benefit of its controllers. Owners,
therefore, must act to protect their property against expropriation
by controllers with divergent interests.' At present, pension funds
constitute the largest single source of investment capital in the
United States.2 This Comment examines both the extent to which
trustee management of state and local public3 pension funds sepa-
t The author would like to thank Professor Roberta Romano and Mr. Marc Kruithof
for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. See generally Fama &Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 27J. L. & ECON. 301
(1983).
2. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 129 (Comm. Print
1978) [herinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT] (the estimate of the size of pension in-
vestment funds includes both public and private funds). This Comment focuses on the
regulatory provisions that control the investment decisions of fund trustees. It does not
specifically consider the funding problems which plague public plans. Many of the argu-
ments proposed herein, however, are equally applicable to funding issues. Neither does
this Comment consider the policy implications of the essentially private retirement sys-
tem currently in place in the United States. The Comment accepts the existing pension
framework including both public and private plans without expressing a view as to this
framework's desireability.
3. This Comment discusses only pension plans for state and local government em-
ployees. Although the arguments made in this Comment may have implications for pen-
sion plans for federal government employees, those implications will not be discussed
herein. Any reference to "public plans" or "public funds," therefore, is intended to
refer only to state or local government plans or funds. Generally, public plans can be
categorized by level of administration. Over 80% of public plans are administered at
the city and township levels. State governments administer only 9.6% of the total
number of public plans. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 56.
The growing importance of public plans is demonstrated by the recent dramatic ex-
pansion of public plan assets. According to best estimates for 1982, public pension
funds held $265 billion in assets. Public Employee Pension Benefit Plans: Joint Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means and Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, 58 (1983) (state-
ment of Alicia H. Munnell, Vice President and Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Bos-
ton) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Within 15 years, the value of those funds is expected
to exceed one trillion dollars. Id. at 140 (statement ofJohnJ. Sweeny, President, Service




rates ownership and control into groups with divergent interests4
and the measures necessary to align those interests to insure that
management of public funds benefits their owner/participants. 5
The first section of the Comment outlines current regulation gov-
erning the investment of public pension funds and concludes that,
at present, despite an apparent disparity in returns on public funds
as compared with similar investment funds, 6 there exist no effective
regulations limiting trustees to investments which benefit plan par-
ticipants. 7 Even worse, current regulation does not discourage, and
in many states requires, the use of trustees who possess clear con-
flicts of interest with plan participants. 8 The second section ad-
dresses both the constitutionality and the desirability of federal
regulation of public pension fund trustees. First, it concludes that
federal regulation would be a constitutional exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers under the standard recently enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
4. Public pension plans are established by state and local governments to provide
retirement income for their employees. Murphy, Regulating Public Employee Retirement Sys-
tems for Portfolio Efficiency, 67 MINN. L. REV. 211, 213-24 (1982) states that:
The primary reason for the establishment of pension plans, whether public or pri-
vate, is to provide employees with a source of income during retirement ... Em-
ployer pension plans developed as an integral component of the nation's retirement
system to fill the gap between the level of income need for employees to maintain
an adequate standard of living during retirement and the level of income provided
by social security and personal savings.
See also L. KOHLMEIER, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND ASSET
MANAGEMENT 4 (1976). Public pension funds were originally started to compensate po-
lice officers and firemen for the dangerousness of their work. At this time, public em-
ployee wages were generally lower than those of the private sector. While pay scales for
the public and private sector are currently almost equal, pension plans continue to offer
more liberal benefits in the public sector. Id. at 7; Herbert, Investment Regulation and
Conflicts of Interest in Employer-Managed Pension Plans, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 127,
132 n.42 (1976) (employer-sponsored pension benefits increase employee productivity
and longevity of service).
5. For a discussion of the extent to which fund participants have an ownership inter-
est in their expected benefits, see infra note 74 and accompanying text.
6. For example, from 1970-1980, insurance companies earned an average annual
return of 6.5%. A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 109 (1982). During
the same period, public funds earned approximately 5.8%. Hearings, supra note 3, at 141
(Statement ofJohn J. Sweeny, President, Service Employees International Union, AFL-
CIO, accompanied by Steve Pruitt, Legislative Director). In 1981, the annual rate of
return on public funds was 3.3%. Id. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 131
(rate of return on public plans was 5.4-5.5% in 1975). The importance of this difference
is underscored by the fact that one percentage point difference in annual rate of return
supports either a 20% decrease in the cost of providing pensions or a 25% increase in
pension benefits to fund participants. See T. BLEAKNEY, RETIREMENT SYSTEMS FOR PUB-
LIC EMPLOYEES 131 (1972); Herbert, supra note 4, at 136 n.7.
7. See infra notes 71-106 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
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Authority.9 Second, it argues that regulation of trustee investment
decisions is desirable because no market mechanism functions to
align the divergent interests of public plan trustees and partici-
pants.' 0 Finally, it argues that the federal government is the appro-
priate regulator because state regulation of state-controlled funds
vests the monitoring of trustee investment decisions in an entity, the
state, which, in its role as a controller of the fund, possesses inter-
ests at odds with those of fund participants. I The last section of the
Comment considers the special problems federal legislators face in
drafting regulations to control public fund trustees.'
2
I. The Current Regulatory Framework
Regulations governing public funds exist at both the state and
federal levels. At present, the federal government attempts to con-
trol public funds primarily through income tax regulations.'
3
Broader regulation of public funds and their trustees has been left
to the states, which have responded by subjecting trustees to both
general fiduciary standards and specific limitations on investment
choices. None of these regulations adequately insure that trustees
invest for the benefit of fund participants.
A. Federal Regulation
On the federal level, it is well settled that any trust which is part of
a private retirement plan is tax exempt only if the plan meets the
requirements of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. 14 Since
9. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). See infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 133-68 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 168-85 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text.
13. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 84, 87
(Statement of the American Federation of State, County and Local Employees); Camp-
bell & Josephson, Public Pension Trustees Pursuit of Social Goals, 24 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 43, 57 (1983); Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress 90
HARV. L. REV. 992 n.3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fiscal Distress]. Although other
sources of federal regualation do allow for review of some aspects of public pension
fund management, they do not address the investment decision. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 7-42. Moreover, "the absence of any single federal agency to coordinate
the administration and enforcement of the various federal laws relating to retirement
income has precluded the development of a uniform national policy with regard to pub-
lic employee retirement systems." Id. at 2. Importantly, public plans are not affected by
either the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), or the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141. (1982). These Acts establish the right
of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing for the
terms of pension and welfare plans. State and local employees are specifically excluded
from coverage under the Acts. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 38.




1972, the Internal Revenue Service has.taken the position that gov-
ernment-sponsored public employee retirement plans must also
meet the requirements of section 401(a) in order to enjoy the tax
benefits of a qualified plan.
15
In order to qualify for tax exempt status, pension plans must, inter
alia, be organized for the exclusive benefit of employees, provide
definitely determinable benefits, satisfy anti-discrimination rules
and provide full vesting on discontinuance or termination of the
plan. 16 If these standards could be enforced against public pension
plans by the Internal Revenue Service, many of the problems ad-
dressed by this Comment would be solved. In practice, however, it
is impossible for the Internal Revenue Service effectively to regulate
public pension fund trustees.i
7
The sanction for failure to meet the requirements of section
401(a) is disqualification of the plan.' 8 This sanction functions as a
significant deterrent in the private sector because disqualification
subjects the plan to taxation. The only consequence of disqualifying
a public plan, however, is the cancellation of special tax benefits
provided the employees.' 9 Enforcing section 401(a) for public
13, at 57-58. The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982), ERISA, changed many of the provisions applicable to private plan
qualification. Public plans were exempted from ERISA. Public plans, therefore, con-
tinue to be covered by the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) in effect
when ERISA was enacted on September 1, 1974. Id. at 58 n.76.
15. Rev. Rul. 72-14, 1982-1 C.B. 106. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 162, 164
(statement of S. Allen Winborne, Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revnue - Em-
ployee Plans and Exempt Organizations).
16. Section 401 of the I.R.C. sets forth three tiers of protection. See Campbell &
Josephson, supra note 13, at 83. Section 401(a) of the I.R.C. requires that the trust be
created or organized "for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries."
Section 401 (a)(l) requires that any contributions made to the trust be "for the purpose
of distributing to such employees or their beneficiaries the corpus and income accumu-
lated by the trust." Section 401 (a)(2) requires that trust funds be used "for the exclusive
benefit of the employees and their beneficiaries." Section 503 sets forth transactions
which are prohibited to public plans including the proscription under section 503(b) of
any transactions between affiliated persons and the plan which are unfair to the plan. See
id. at 86.
17. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 33 (interpretation by IRS that public
plans are subject to qualification requirements "has had virtually no practical signifi-
cance for state and local plans. Enforcement of the qualification standards against pub-
lic plans has been for the most part non-existent."). The Internal Revenue Service,
moreover, has stated both that the "exclusive benefit rule" does not prevent others
drawing some benefit from a transaction with the trust, and that the rule only requires
that the primary purpose of the investment be to benefit employees. Herbert, supra note 4,
at 141 (citing Rev. Rul. 73-380, 1973-72 Cum. Bull. 124, 125); Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2
Cum. Bull. 88; Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 85.
18. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1985). Cf. Herbert, supra note 4, at 141 n.7 (discussing IRS re-
luctance to enforce tax sanctions against private plans).
19. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 30, states that:
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plans, thus harms the public pension plan participant rather than
the plan sponsor, even though the participant may have had little or
no control over the activities which caused the disqualification.20
Tax sanctions are thus not an effective means of regulating public
pension plan trustees.
The realization that enforcement harmed only innocent plan par-
ticipants, coupled with the complexity involved in enforcing section
401(a) for public plans, led the Internal Revenue Service, in 1977,
to announce that, until a study could be made of the problem, all
disputes over qualification under section 401(a) would be settled in
favor of the taxpayer or governmental unit.2 ' This announcement
remains in effect today; by holding to it, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, and with it the federal government, has effectively withdrawn
from any attempt at regulating public plans.
B. State Regulation22
Public pension fund trustees have two basic duties when manag-
Qualification of a pension plan under 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code results
in three major tax benefits for employees, employers, and their pension plans:
(1) The employer's contributions to the plan are deductible when made, even if
the employee is not vested in them at the time
(2) the earnings of the pension trust funds are not taxed currently
(3) the contributions made by an employer to a plan on behalf of an employee
are not currently imputed to the employee, even if vested. Also, advantageous tax
treatment is afforded to a participant who receives a lump-sum distribution from a
qualified plan, and favorable income tax treatment and estate tax treatment are
available with regard to death benefits paid from a qualified plan.
The only one of these benefits which is clearly applicable to public plans is the third -
deferral of the recognition of income by the employee. The other benefits are available
to state or local governments, regardless of their status as qualified, because state and
local governments are generally exempt from federal taxes. See TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 2, at 31. See also New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (states are
immune from federal taxation when they act as governments); Hearings, supra note 3, at
165 (statement of S. Allen Winborne, Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue-
Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations); Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at
59-62. But see id. at 59 n.84 (arguing that disqualification of plan would breach fiduciary
duty of plan trustee). Public pension fund trustees' lack of concern over IRS rules is
demonstrated by the fact that, in 1976, 57% of government plan administrators sur-
veyed were unaware of the IRS qualification process. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
2, at 77.
20. Cf Hearings, supra note 3, at 165 (statement of S. Allen Winborne, Assistant Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue-Employer Plans and Exempt Organizations, noting con-
cern that enforcement of section 401(a) harms plan participants). Public pension plans
are run unilaterally by their boards of trustees. Participants have no input into fund
management and often are unrepresented on the board. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4,
at 17.
21. Information Release, 1869 (August 10, 1977). See also Hearings, supra note 3, at
164 (statement of S. Allen Winborne, Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue-
Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations).
22. Any analysis of public plans must acknowledge a general dearth of reliable
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ing fund assets. 23 First, they must act at all times with strict loyalty
to fund participants and their beneficiaries.2 4 Second, they must ad-
minister the funds of the trust prudently.2 5 This prudence require-
ment is implemented in two ways: broad definitions of generally
acceptable standards for investment conduct and specific restric-
tions on investment choice.
26
The interplay of these fiduciary duties was illuminated in the re-
cent case of Withers v. Teachers Retirement System. 27 In Withers, benefi-
ciaries of the Teachers Retirement System (TRS) of the city of New
York alleged that a decision by TRS trustees to purchase $860 mil-
lion of New York City bonds violated the trustees' fiduciary duties to
plan beneficiaries. 28 Under New York law, public fund trustees have
information concerning those plans. For example, even the number of public plans can
only be approximated. A 1978 congressional study cited the existence of 6,000 plans,
yet the annual census of governments for that year reports only 3,075. Hearings, supra
note 3, at 57, 58 (statement ofAlicia H. Munnel, Vice President and Economist, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston). The lack of information regarding public plans results from
an absence of systematic procedures for gathering data on the plans; few state statutes
impose adequate disclosure requirements and public funds have generally failed to
provide information independently. For example, asset values of public funds can only
be approximated because 60-70% of public funds do not disclose the market value of
their assets. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 131, 186. Liebeg & Kolman, How
Much Regulation Do Public Plans Need, PENSION WORLD 22, 24 (August 1978), reprinted in
Hearings, supra note 3, at 127-31. Reporting assets at book value is misleading and may
overstate asset value. L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 5. Even when funds do disclose
information, the information's accuracy remains open to question. Independent
external audits of public pension plans are generally not required and are almost never
conducted on a regular basis. Some plans have never been audited. TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 81, 186. The absence of independent audits increases the
possibility of abuse. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 69.
23. Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 48. The basic rules involving invest-
ment decisions by public pension fund trustees derive from the common law of trusts.
Id. at 50. Moreover, statutes applicable to the investment decision often incorporate
these common law concepts. Id. at 48, 50, 67. See generally Herbert, supra note 4, at 143-
147 (discussing trust law applicable to private trusts before passage of ERISA).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1957)[hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT]; G. BOGERT, LAw OF TRUSTS § 95 at 343-50 (5th ed. 1973); 2 A. SCorr, LAw
OF TRUSTS § 170 at 1297-98 (3d ed. 1967 Supp. 1981); Campbell & Josephson, supra
note 13, at 67-87.
25. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 174; G. BOGERT, supra note 24, § 93 at 337-
39; A. SCOTr, supra note 24, § 174 at 1408-12; Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at
87-109.
26. See Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 87-109. See also Kirshner v. United
States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978); Tron v. Condello, 427 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). See also Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV.
72, 100-01 (1980); Ravikoff & Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Pru-
dent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1980).
27. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
28. These purchases were specially authorized by state statute. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch.
890, as amended by 1978 N.Y. Laws chs. 488 & 785. Chapter 890 authorized TRS trustees
to consider, in connection with investment in New York city bonds, the extent to which
this investment would help the city fulfill its obligation to fund participants. These
provisions of Chapter 890 were approved by Pub. L. 94-236 which permitted New York
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the same investment powers as do the trustees of savings banks. 29
These investment powers are defined by a "legal list" of permissible
investments which includes municipal bonds.
30
In analyzing the prudence of the investment decision by TRS
trustees, the court first determined that the purchase was statutorily
authorized because municipal bonds were included on the legal
list.31 Second, the court considered whether the trustees had exer-
cised prudence with respect to their investment, that is, whether the
specific New York municipal bonds purchased represented a re-
sponsible investment. At this level of analysis, the court applied the
common law fiduciary standard of the "prudent man." The court
looked to whether the trustees had .'employ[ed] such diligence and
such prudence in the care and management [of the fund], as, in gen-
eral, prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters,
employ in their own like affairs.' "32 In accord with the general rule
in New York, the court examined the merits of the individual invest-
ment decision without considering its effect on the trust's over-all
portfolio of assets.
33
The court upheld the trustees' decision in light of the fact that,
without the TRS bond purchase, the city arguably would have gone
bankrupt. Because TRS was not "fully funded," 34 and because
state and city pension funds to purchase New York city bonds without losing their tax
exempt status. Act of Mar. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-236, 90 Stat. 238. Pub. L. 94-236 was
augmented in 1978 by Pub. L. 95-497 which attached numerous conditions to pension
fund purchase of bonds. Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. 95-497, 92 Stat. 1665. See Camp-
bell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 62-63 n.105-107. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 33-34.
It is not clear, however, that the Withers court relied on statutory provisions in uphold-
ing the TRS trustees' investment decision. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at
100-01.
29. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § B20-31.0 (1985).
30. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235 (McKinney 1985).
31. Withers v. Teachers Retirement System, 447 F.Supp. at 1254.
32. Id. (quoting King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 85-86 (1869)). Generally, the New York
courts apply a somewhat stricter standard than courts in most other states. In New
York, a trustee must act as "a cautious prudent investor who is more interested in pre-
serving capital than in taking the risks necessary for significant capital appreciation."
Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 49 (citing A. ScoTr, supra note 24, § 227.3 at
1812).
33. 447 F. Supp. at 1255. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 49 ("In New
York and other jurisdictions following traditional common law principles, a fiduciary
must exercise the same prudence with respect to each investment decision."); Id. at 96-
97 (citing King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 90 (1869) for the proposition that "it is the common
law view that the prudence of each individual investment is weighed separately and that
gains from one investment may not be used to excuse losses from another").
34. 447 F. Supp. at 1251. Funding is the systematic scheduling of contributions to a
pension fund based on its long term needs. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 5. Most
public plans are funded. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 145; Murphy, supra




TRS's principal asset was the city's contractual obligation to pay
benefits, the court held that the trustees had acted in the best inter-
est of the plan participants by acting to assist the city in avoiding
potential bankruptcy.
35
The Withers court also considered possible trustee conflicts of in-
terest in the context of public plans.36 The plaintiffs in Withers as-
serted that the fact that one TRS trustee was employed as the
deputy comptroller of the City of New York rendered him incapable
of fairly representing the interests of the beneficiaries of the fund.
7
In his role as a city official, this trustee had helped develop, and
remained an active proponent of, the city's financial recovery plan.3 8
The court held that this conflict of interest did not preclude the city
official from acting as trustee for the public fund, but only created
"an especial obligation to act fairly on behalf of those concerned
with the results of the action taken." 39
Withers thus stands for the proposition that, when fiduciary rela-
tionships create conflicts of interest which are authorized by statute,
the judiciary is limited to the issue of whether the trustee has acted
in good faith. 40 The essential problem with the Withers standard is
that it is unrealistic to expect that a trustee with a conflict of interest
because it indicates acceptance of the principle that pensions are deferred wages. See L.
KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 16. There are essentially two reasons to fund a pension
plan: (1) it helps insure payment of benefits, and (2) it is actuarially sound because it
accrues the expense of public employment into the current period when the benefits are
enjoyed. See R. TILOVE, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION FUNDS 134-40 (1976); Murphy, supra
note 4, at 214-15; Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1005-06. Underfunding is a problem
because it encourages benefit liberalization and may increase costs if the interest that a
state or city is required to pay is less than the pension fund could have earned from
other sources. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 51-52. For a general discussion of the
funding of public pension plans, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144-79.
35. Withers v. Teachers Retirement System, 447 F. Supp. at 1259. Scholars have
concluded that if there were no emergency, the trustees may not have been permitted to
look beyond traditional factors of safety, return and diversification. See Campbell &Jo-
sephson, supra note 13, at 99; Langbein & Posner, supra note 26, at 10 1-02.
36. 447 F. Supp. at 1256.
37. Id. See also L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 9 ("The dual roles of trustees, pension
fund administrators, and investment managers are at the heart of almost all of the con-
flict-of-interest problems of public funds.").
38. Id. Cf. Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 73 (discussing similar problems
of other New York trustees).
39. 447 F. Supp. at 1256 (quoting Westchester Chapter, Civil Serv. Employee's Ass'n. v.
Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 519, 521, 375 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295, 337 N.E.2d 748, 749 (1975) (per
curiam)).
40. Cf. Donovan v. Bierwerth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. den., 459 U.S. 1069
(1982) (even good faith belief in quality of his actions would not insulate trustee of
private fund from liability under ERISA when he had not made proper investigation
prior to investing). These cases can be distinguished based upon the quality of the in-
vestigation. See Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 105-07. See generally id., at 70-
80 (discussing issues raised by authorized conflicts of interest).
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will be able to change roles as circumstances demand and act in
good faith at all times for all parties concerned. 4' Such an expecta-
tion is particularly unrealistic for trustees, also government officials,
whose future careers may depend much more on the success of the
government as a whole than on the performance of a single pension
plan.4
2
Withers thus exemplifies two major problems with the current reg-
ulation of public pension fund trustees. First, the case demonstrates
the inadequacy of the courts' current approach to the problems
posed by public plan trustees' conflicts of interest. Second, it dem-
onstrates that reliance on a legal list in conjunction with a general
fiduciary standard may be insufficient to prevent trustees from mak-
ing investments not solely for the benefit of plan participants.
1. Conflicts of Interest
The trustee's duty of loyalty requires that he administer the fund
of the trust solely in the interest of plan participants and their bene-
ficiaries. 43 Thus, for example, investments of public pension fund
assets for purposes other than the payment of benefits to plan par-
41. See Note, Conflicts of Interest Arising Under ERISA "s Fiduciary Standards: Can the
Trustee Ever Be Prudent, As Long As He Faces Dual Loyalties?, 9 NOVA L.J. 413 (1985) (arguing
that corporate officers should be disallowed from acting as pension fund trustees under
ERISA). But see Herbert, supra note 4, at 165 (arguing that dual loyalities require that
specific investment restrictions be reinstated).
42. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 206-07 app. I, Table 8. Eighty percent
of public plans have one or more government official on their board. In approximately
50% of public plans, government officials make up more than one-third of the board. In
approximately 40% of public plans, government officials make up more than half of the
board. In 28% of public plans, employees have no board representation. Id. Fewer than
1% of boards of public plans have members who are employed outside government in
fields related to investments. Id. at 67. See also L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 17; Camp-
bell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 70-72. Union officials who act as pension fund trust-
ees may also have conflicts of interest. See Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089
(1971) (union trustees' maintenance of large amount of cash in union-owned bank at no
interest and purchase of utility stock both held to breach fiduciary duty because primar-
ily for benefit of union). For comparisons of Blankenship and Withers, see Langbein &
Posner, supra note 26, at 97-104 (stressing special factors which made TRS purchase
justifiable under traditional trust law); Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 26, at 521-23
(1980) (arguing that Withers permits trustees to compromise traditional objectives);
Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Polit-
ical Goals, 128 U. PENN. L. REV. 1341, 1362 (1980) (noting that New York city was princi-
pal contributor to funds).
43. See A. SCoTr, supra note 24, § 170 at 1298. The duty of loyalty is particularly
intense in the context of a trust created to provide economic support for specific benefi-
ciaries. Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 67. However, under the current regu-
latory structure, persons administrating public pension plans are rarely obligated to
carry out their duties solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries. See TASK FORCE REPORT,




ticipants should violate the trustee's duty of loyalty. 44  More gener-
ally, the trustee's duty of loyalty should prohibit all transactions
posing conflicts of interest. 45 For public pension fund trustees, con-
flicts arise in three contexts. 46 The most obvious conflicts arise
when the trustee has a personal interest in a transaction involving
fund assets.47 The classic example of this problem involves a
trustee's purchase of trust assets. 48 Conflicts may also arise where
the interests of the various beneficiaries of the trust diverge.49  In
the context of retirement plans, a pertinent example would be the
existence of divergent interests between retirees and those still
working. 50 Finally, a trustee may have a conflict between the duty
he owes to the plan participants and the duty he owes to the interest
of another entity. 5' This conflict is especially prevalent among pub-
lic pension plan trustees who often represent the very governmental
44. Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 45.
45. Id. at 68 (citing In re Ryan, 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E.2d 909 (1943) for the proposi-
tion that, "The general duty of loyalty is a flat prohibition of all transactions involving
personal conflicts of interest."). See generally Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (CardozaJ.) ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honestly alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is thus the standard of behavior.").
46. Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 67-68. Although the interests of public
employees and employers in sound pension fund management should, in theory, coin-
cide, in practice many conflicts of interest arise. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 51.
ERISA was passed, in part, to stem similar potential conflicts of interest in private retire-
ment systems. Id. at 7. Potential conflicts of interest arise whenever a trustee has two
duties. Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 69. Actual conflicts arise when these
duties conflict with one another. Id. at 70. "The trustee's duty of loyalty is the duty to
act in the interest of the trust as if the trustee had no interest of his own to protect." Id.
at 50.
47. Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 67.
48. See A. Scorr, supra note 24, § 170.1 at 1299-1304.
49. Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 67. The potential for dual loyalties
faced by public pension trustees is exacerbated because they have overlapping as well as
successive beneficiaries. Id. at 94-95.
50. See id., at 82-83, 94-95; Murphy, supra note 4, at 222-23. In Withers, for example,
those still working may have had a stronger interest in maintaining the long term sol-
vency of the city than those already retired.
51. Public pension fund trustees are usually state or government officials, union
leaders or investment bankers. Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1013. These individuals
all may have duties which conflict with those of the trust. See Campbell & Josephson,
supra note 13, at 71. Government officials have compelling personal, political and gov-
ernmental reasons for favoring investments which benefit their constituencies. Fiscal
Distress, supra note 13, at 1014. Union leaders have an interest in increasing their power
with the union. "[T]he risk cannot be overlooked that union representatives on occa-
sion may see fit to bargain for improved wages or other conditions favoring active em-
ployees of the expense of retirees' benefits." Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 173 (1971). See also Blankenship v. Boyle, 329
F. Supp. 1089 (1971) (union trustee breached trust when he used assets of pension fund
primarily for benefit of union). Investment bankers may also have interests, such as
prior investment in municipal bonds, which conflict with the interests of fund partici-
pants. See Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1014.
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entity which sponsors the fund.52
A recent trend among public plans has been increased investment
in local enterprises as a means of promoting regional economic vi-
tality. 53 Common examples of locally targeted investments include
municipal bonds and mortgages. 54 Withers provides one example of
the trend.55 Local investments are necessarily suspect when made
by public officials who are in a position to gain personally and/or
professionally from such investments.
5 6
Investments targeted to the local community may not conform to
traditional investment criteria for a number of reasons. First, local
investing may result in an underdiversified portfolio of assets.
57
Second, locally targeted investment may increase administrative
costs, resulting in a lower net return to the fund.58 Third, govern-
ment-sponsored securities such as municipal bonds pay lower re-
turns because they are tax exempt. Public pension funds are also
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. The dangers of using state representa-
tives as public pension trustees was demonstrated in Oklahoma in 1975 when the former
governor was convicted of accepting a bribe to influence the state retirement board's
investment policies. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 20. See also Campbell &Joseph-
son, supra note 13, at 71-2 (explaining conflicts of interest present in certain New York
city pension plan boards of trustees).
53. Local investment is a specific example of the more general problem of social
investment by pension funds. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 43-44 n.5
(defining terms used to describe various nontraditional investment approaches). Social
investment by public funds has recently received much scholarly attention. See Campbell
&Josephson, supra note 13; Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 42; Langbein & Posner, supra
note 26; Schotland, Should Pension Funds be Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?, 119 TR. & EST.
Sept. 1980 at 10, Oct. 1980 at 27, Nov. 1980 at 26. This Comment focuses on the
problems caused by locally targeted investments because they are the most prevalent
form of social investment by public funds. See Murrmann, Shaffer & Wokutch, Social
Investing by State Public Employee Pension Funds, 35 LABOR L.J. 360, 364 (1984). Local in-
vestment also raises the clearest conflict of interest issues. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 192.
54. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 191-93; L. KOHtLMEIER, supra note 4, at 47;
Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 43-44.
55. Withers v. Teachers Retirement System, 447 F. Supp. 1248 (1976).
56. Locally targeted investments "raise issues of fiduciary conflicts of interest since
many public pension fund trustees are also government officials negotiating in the con-
text of state and municipal budgets." Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 45.
57. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 26, at 90 ("Even worse effects on diversifica-
tion would be caused by a decision to concentrate the fund's assets in one state or re-
gion: in Michigan, for example, which has been so hard hit by the near collapse of the
domestic automobile industry."). See generally Murphy, supra note 4, at 219 ("Un-
derdiversification results from sampling error created by the limited number of potential
investments and sampling bias caused by financially comparable social investing criteria
that exclude a disproportionate number of investments in large firms concentrated in
particular regions and industries.").
58. Transactions costs are increased by the need to determine and monitor the
needs of the local community. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 26, at 93 (socially
conscious investor incurs costs of security analysis and trading); Murphy, supra note 4, at
219 (transactions costs increase "because of a need to anticipate and respond to chang-




tax exempt, however, and are therefore accepting lower returns with
no corresponding benefit. 59 Fourth, to the extent that public pen-
sion plans are willing to invest in local enterprise, the market may
not adjust returns to reflect investment risks. 60 Thus, although lo-
cal investments may serve an arguably legitimate political purpose,
they generally either subject fund participants to additional risk or
result in lower returns. Such locally targeted investments arguably
may conform to traditional investment theory only if they produce
non-financial collateral returns to public fund participants that com-
pensate for their financial losses. 61
A collateral benefit justification for local investment has obvious
59. Investment in municipal bonds is the classic conflict facing public pension funds.
See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 193 (investment in municipals violates
fiduciary duties); R. TILOVE, supra note 34, at 217 (1976) ("There is near universal agree-
ment among knowledgeable observers that it is inherently imprudent for a tax-exempt
governmental pension plan to invest in tax-exempt state and local government securi-
ties."). Yet from 1975-76, local pension fund investment in state and local government
securities rose from 2.2 to 7.5%, and state pension fund investment rose from .7 to
1.4%. This trend was continuing in 1978. The percentage of local investment varies
between plans. Many local New York plans have more than a 35% investment in munici-
pal bonds. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 133-35. In Revere, Massachusetts, the
local plan invested 59% of its assets in municipal bonds. Id. at 193. In 1975-76, 2.8% of
all assets held in public plans were invested in state and local government securities. Id.
at 134. Reluctance to divest municipal bonds may reflect a hesitancy either to suffer
book losses or to weaken the market for the municipal bonds. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra
note 4, at 47. Although it is argued that investment in municipal bonds indirectly bene-
fits participants, "in practice, however, the funds' investments in the obligators of their
own states or municipalities do not seem to have been made for any high public or social
purpose." Id. at 45. Investments in employer-sponsored securities pose conflicts
problems for private funds as well. See generally Herbert, supra note 4. The difference is
that the tax-exempt problem does not exist for private plans.
60. For example, between 1980 and 1982, at least 10 states invested in privately-
insured, mortgage-backed securities that were significantly riskier and less liquid than
the federal government's insured "Ginnie Maes," at yields that were generally below the
Ginnie Mae rate. Hearings, supra note 3, at 60. Because the public plan was willing to
purchase the securities, the market did not adjust the yield to reflect the higher risk. See
Murphy, supra note 4, at 219; Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1008-09. Problems with
local mortgages are often correlated with problems with municipal bonds. This suggests
that local mortgage investments, like municipal bond investments, are authorized "as
much for the benefit of local construction industries, lending institutions and home buy-
ers as for pension fund beneficiaries." L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 47. "When local
yields are not so high as those obtainable elsewhere, it makes no sense for a legislature
to limit mortgage acquisitions to a pension fund's home state or city." Id. at 48. For
other issues raised by investment in local mortgages, see L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at
48-49; Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 109-113; Murphy, supra note 4, at 223-
24.
61. Collateral returns for participants from locally targeted investments might in-
clude increased city services, new jobs, lower taxes or increased job security. See Mur-
phy, supra note 4, at 221. But see Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 47 (collateral
benefits cannot justify imprudent investments under current law); Langbein & Posner,
supra note 26, at 93-96 (collateral benefit justification is not possible where participants
do not choose investments). Cf. Murphy, supra note 4, at 223 ("a strong policy argument
can be made that workers should not be able to trade a portion of their future retire-
ment income for present collateral returns.").
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problems.62 The cost attendant to determinations of collateral ben-
efits makes their consideration administratively infeasible for plan
trustees. 63 Moreover, it is questionable whether the public pension
trust is the proper vehicle for these types of policy decisions. 64 Col-
lateral benefits received through political investments may also ben-
efit some members of the fund at the expense of others. For
example, increased employment security would provide a collateral
benefit to workers without providing any corresponding benefit to
retirees.65 These problems have led commentators to conclude that
collateral goals should be pursued only to the extent that invest-
ments result in a diversified portfolio which earns a return equal to
that of a non-politically motivated investment portfolio at the same
risk level with no significant additional cost to the fund. 66
Potential conflicts also face public pension fund trustees in their
choice of service providers. 67 Pressures exist for public plans to use
local service providers, even though better or lower-cost service
62. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 47; Langbein & Posner, supra note
26, at 93; Murphy, supra note 4, at 222.
63. The fund manager needs a system for quantifying collateral benefits, determin-
ing the values each participant places on the collateral benefits and reconciling the
differences among values. . . . Costs attendant to making, reviewing and modify-
ing these determinations render social welfare maximization through fund manage-
ment administratively infeasible.
Murphy, supra note 4, at 222.
64. The argument has been made that because it is taxpayers who ultimately bear
the costs of providing public pension funds, collateral benefit justifications for locally
targeted investments should be permitted. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, pen-
sion benefits are equivalent to deferred compensation. Therefore, public pension funds
are held in trust for participants and the needs of taxpayers are irrelevant. See infra note
74 and accompanying text. Second, even if the needs of taxpayers are to be taken into
account, it is not in their best interest for public pension funds to select locally targeted
investments which increase risk or lower return for the fund, resulting in higher funding
needs which must be met through taxation. It would be better for taxpayers if social
policies were accomplished directly through the political process in which they have a
direct say. It is not the function of public pension trustees to make policy decisions
concerning which social goals are to be pursued with taxpayers' dollars. Murphy, supra
note 4, at 225-27.
65. Murphy, supra note 4, at 222-23.
66. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 47; Langbein & Posner, supra note
26, at 94-95; Murphy, supra note 4, at 227. But see A. Scorr, supra note 24, at § 227.17
(Supp. 1985); Ravikoff& Curzan, supra note 26, at 526 n.28; Fiscal Distress, supra note 13,
at 1010. This does not mean that social benefits cannot be considered at all. "[I]n con-
sidering two prudent investments of equal financial merit, trustees should be able to
choose the investment offering the more desirable indirect benefits to the pension fund
or the greater benefit to the participants community." Campbell & Josephson, supra
note 13, at 47. See also Murphy, supra note 4, at 218. But see Langbein & Posner, supra
note 26, at 93. For a comparison of the practical problems of considering collateral
benefits in defined benefit versus defined contribution plans, see Murphy, supra note 4,
at 221 n.32, 223 n.37.
67. Public fund investment in common stock has increased conflict of interest
problems involving the allocation of brokerage commissions, the payment of fees for




providers are available elsewhere. 68 To the extent that the use of
local service providers results in higher administrative costs to the
fund, this harms fund participants and their beneficiaries. Yet state
regulation fails to guard against such a result. In fact, in many states,
statutory or common law provisions mandate the use of local service
providers or investments. 69 These statutes are promulgated by state
representatives who may benefit from the use of local investment
and service providers. To the extent that state regulation fails to
prevent conflicts which result in politically motivated investment
policies, public plan trustees face an increased risk of never receiv-
ing their promised benefits.
70
2. Investment Standards
State regulation of public fund trustee investment takes two
forms: first, a broad definition of a generally acceptable standard
for investment conduct, and second, specific restrictions on invest-
ment choices. The latter include both legal list statutes enumerat-
ing all permissible investments, and statutes limiting fund purchase
of certain types of investments to a given percentage of total fund
investment. Most states attempt to regulate investment decisions
with a combination of specific investment restrictions and general
fiduciary duties imposed either by common law or statute. 71 Such a
regulatory combination was evident in Withers. Over-reliance on
legal lists, however, may cause state laws establishing general fiduci-
supra note 4, at 31. Most public funds do not disclose how these decisions are made. Id.
at 25.
68. A recent study of the conflict of interest problems in public funds states:
One of the most persistent conflict-of-interest situations in the management of pub-
lic pension funds results from the policy, followed by many funds, of hiring local
bankers, brokers, and investment advisors and the practice of investing in local se-
curities, even though better-or lower cost-services and higher yielding invest-
ments may well be available outside local boundaries.
L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 3, at 23.
69. A 1978 Pension Task Force Survey discovered that approximately one-fifth of
large public pension systems are limited by statute or policy to selecting only investment
advisors with in-state offices. Two-thirds of all government plans are required to use in-
state brokerage firms to execute trades. More than half of large public systems are re-
quired to select local asset custodians. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 191. See also
Hearings, supra note 3, at 103 (statement of the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees); L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 23.
70. When assets are managed or invested for any purpose, no matter how merito-
rious in terms of general social policy, other than to benefit the participants of the
pension plan the legitimate interests of the plan participants are jeopardized.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 192.
71. The following chart outlines the extent of current state regulation of public pen-
sion plans:
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ary duties to be less specific than desirable. 72
a. General Duties
State regulations governing public plans were developed at a time
when pension benefits for public employees were considered gratui-




Legal limitations on pension fund investments, 1983
PRUDENT MAN ONLY-6 STATES
Indiana Teachers Retirement System
Nevada
South Dakota


























NO STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS-I STATE
Wyoming
Munnell, Blais & Keefe, The Pitfalls of Social Investing: The Case of Public Pensions and Hous-
ing, NEW ENGLAND ECONOMIC REVIEW, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON (Septem-
ber/October 1983), reprinted in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 445-47 1. See also L.
KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 8 n.9.
72. Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Alicia H. Munnel, Vice President and
Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2,
at 4 (public plan trustees generally are confronted either with no statutory guidance or
with a confusing maze of laws "leading to conflicts, confusion, and the inadequate allo-
cation of fiduciary responsibilities"); Id. at 186 (public fund trustee stating that Alabama
has "absolutely no policy guidelines for the person in my position").
73. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8; L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 5. See
also Murphy, supra note 4, at 258 n.205 (recent cases holding public employee pensions
to be gratuities); Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 994-97 (discussing cases holding pen-




recognized, however, that pensions are not mere gratuities; rather,
they are a form of deferred compensation earned by the employee
while he is working and held in trust for him by the employer until
retirement.7 4 With the recognition that pension funds are trusts has
come a general agreement that those who control public pension
plan assets should act as fiduciaries for plan participants. 75 Neither
state law nor most plans, however, adequately define what duties are
created by this fiduciary status.7
6
The common law standard of prudence requires that trustees, in
making their investment decisions, "observe how men of prudence,
discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs." 77 Under this
standard, the safety of the corpus of the trust should be the primary
consideration of the trustee in making investment decisions.78 The
trustee, however, must also procure a reasonable income on trust
assets.79 In analyzing individual investment decisions by trustees,
74. To the extent that employees forego higher wage levels or make mandatory
contributions to a retirement plan fund in exchange for income during their retire-
ment years, employer retirement programs serve as a means of deferring wages.
Murphy, supra note 4, at 214. See also H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1984)
(pension rights are in the nature of property rights); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2,
at 8-9 (trend is toward viewing public pensions as property or contract interests); Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 83, 92 (assets of pension fund "belong to participants"); Id. at 154
(absent pension increases salary increases would be expected); L. KOHLMEIER, supra note
4, at 16 (funding of public plans important because it indicates acceptance of the princi-
ple that pension funds are deferred wages); Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1010 ("The
more reasonable view is that pensions are deferred compensation"). In the pension
context, the legislature purports to confer a present benefit in the form of a current
promise of deferred compensation. The employee forsakes the opportunity to earn a
pension with a different employer in reliance on this promise. See Fiscal Distress, supra
note 13, at 997 n.37 (comparing social security to public pension plans). The hesitancy
of some courts to recognize a participant's interest in receiving his benefits stems from a
desire to allow the legislature flexibility to adjust pension benefits. Fiscal Distress, supra
note 13, at 994 (courts must balance conflicting interests of employee and state). These
concerns have led to the suggestion that courts should apply a property analysis which
focuses on the employee's reasonable expecation of his pension benefits. id. at 1003.
See also Spina v. Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 197
A.2d 169 (1964) (employee has property interest in public pension fund). See generally
Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, (comparing property, contract and gratuity characterizations
of public funds).
75. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 183; L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 16.
76. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-5, 188-190.
77. Harvard College v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick) 446 (1830). A trustee is generally
required to exercise the skill of a reasonably prudent person making investment deci-
sions. A. ScoTr, supra note 24, § 227.2 at 1811. An above-average investor is required
to exercise his above-average skill. Id.; Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 103.
78. See T. BLEAKNEY, supra note 6, at 141 ("statutory restrictions generally have the
purpose of protecting the principal"); A. ScoTr, supra note 24, § 227.3 at 1811 (primary
purpose of trustee should be to preserve estate); Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13,
at 88 ("safety of the trust corpus is the single most important factor"). Prudence is a
matter of trustee conduct rather than investment performance. Id. at 50. Higher poten-
tial return will not justify imprudent investment conduct. Id. at 95.
79. See A. SCorr, supra note 24, § 227.3 at 1811-12; Campbell & Josephson, supra
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the common law requires both that each investment be prudent,8 0
and that the trustee do a careful investigation of the asset prior to
purchase.8 ' In this way, the common law prudence standard se-
verely limits the ability of the trustee to maintain an economically
efficient portfolio of assets for the fund.
Any investment has two elements: risk and return.8 2 Investors
are assumed to be risk averse; that is, if two investments have the
same expected return, the investor will choose the investment with
the lower risk.83 Therefore, the risk averse investor will be willing
to pay more for an investment with less risk-the higher the relevant
risk of an investment, the higher its returns must be to attract the
risk averse investor.8 4
Not all risk is relevant to the investment decision, however. Risk
is of two types: systematic and unsystematic risk. Unsystematic risk
is that risk which can be eliminated by carrying a diversified portfo-
lio of assets.85 Because the risk can be eliminated by diversification,
it is not compensated for by higher returns in the market. The only
risk which is compensated is systematic risk.86 Systematic risk is
compensated because it is correlated with market performance and
so cannot be eliminated by diversification.8 7 The only risk relevant
to the investment decision, therefore, should be systematic risk.
The common law standard of prudence requires that each individ-
ual investment be prudent."" Yet the addition of risky investments
to a diversified portfolio may reduce the systematic risk of the port-
folio.8 9 Therefore, by not permitting the trustee to make any risky
investments, the common law standard may result in the public pen-
note 13, at 92 (standard applied in New York demands either reasonable and regular
amount of income or that level of income which will not require trustee to incur undue
risks).
80. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
81. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 104. See also Donovan v. Bierwirth,
680 F.2d 263 at 276. (neither prudence nor good faith will insulate ERISA trustee who
fails to properly investigate investment prior to purchase).
82. See R. BREALY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 129 (2d ed. 1984).
83. Id.; Langbein & Posner, supra note 26, at 78.
84. See R. BREALY & S. MYERS, supra note 82, at 129; Langbein & Posner, supra note
26, at 79.
85. See R. BREALY & S. MYERS, supra note 82, at 125 n.12; Langbein & Posner, supra
note 26, at 79.
86. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 26, at 80.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
89. A stock may have a high over-all risk and a low systematic risk. Langbein &
Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law, 1976 A.B.A. FOUND. RES.J. 1, 18 [herein-
after cited as Market Funds]. Moreover, where the risks of two stocks are reciprocal, they
will cancel out and lower overall portfolio risk. Id. at 8. See also R. BREALY & S. MYERS,
supra note 82, at 144. See also Market Funds, supra, at 17 (no advantage to fund from




sion fund carrying a less than optimal portfolio because the fund is
forced to carry risk uncompensated by the market.90 Because pen-
sion plan participants are risk averse, they are harmed by this regu-
latory structure. 9 1 Concern over this has led to the current
proposals for federal regulation of public pension plans which seek
to abolish prudence requirements for individual investments.
92
Another problem with relying on the common law standard of
prudence is its uncertain applicability to public pension funds.93 In
cases where the common law standard has been applied to public
pension fund trustees, the statutes establishing the fund employed
traditional trust language to describe the relationship between the
members of the board and plan participants. 94 Many public funds
do not use traditional trust language, however, and it remains un-
clear whether, without statutory language indicating a traditional
trust relationship, the common law of trusts is applicable.
95
State statutes have failed to resolve the problems created by com-
mon law doctrines. State statutes which create or regulate public
plans rarely articulate appropriate general guidelines for the fiduci-
ary responsibilities of trustees. 96 They denote neither who within
the structure of the public plan is to be held accountable, nor the
substance of relevant fiduciary responsibilities. 97 In cases of trustee
abuse, therefore, the absence of a codified, substantive standard of
conduct to which the fiduciary can be held, whether derived from
statutory regulations, common law or the plan itself, frequently pre-
cludes recovery by plan participants.
98
b. Investment Restrictions
Most states also have statutes which limit the investment choices
90. See Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 97; Langbein & Posner, supra note
26, at 79.
91. Because the fund could earn the same return at a lower risk through diversifica-
tion, a regulatory structure which limits diversification forces the fund to incur risk with-
out compensation. For this reason, risk averse plan participants who prefer their plans
to bear no uncompensated risk are harmed by the current regulatory structure. Financial
theorists assume that investors are risk averse. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note
26, at 78 ("economic theory implies and empirical study confirms that investors are gen-
erally risk adverse").
92. See infra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
93. Liebeg & Kolman, supra note 22, at 25. See also Herbert, supra note 4, at 146
(discussing this problem in context of private trusts).
94. See Withers v. Teachers Retirement Systems, 447 F. Supp. 1248 (1976); Camp-
bell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 48, 51.
95. Liebeg & Kolman, supra note 22, at 25.
96. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 71, 188.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 189.
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available to public plan trustees. 9 9 For example, trustee investment
in common stock is generally limited to a specified percentage of the
plan's portfolio. 0 0 Many states further limit public fund trustees by
promulgating specific "legal lists" of permissible investments.' 10 In
these states, the legislature takes a more active role in structuring
the fund portfolio by circumscribing the role of the plan trustee to
choosing from among a predetermined set of statutorily acceptable
investments. Even when selecting from the "legal list," however,
the trustee may remain bound to general fiduciary
responsibilities. 102
The problem with specific investment limits is that they overly re-
strict public pension plan trustees.' 03 By limiting the field of per-
missible investment choices, they may result in an underdiversified
portfolio bearing uncompensated risk.'0 4 Moreover, the legislature
is not the proper determinant of investment strategies for public
pension plans. First, legislatures have an overt political interest in
promoting local investment to the detriment of plan participants.
10 5
Second, each public plan has different investment needs determined
by its size, its time focus, and the structure of its workforce. 10 6 It is
therefore not clear that the legislature could promulgate a list of
investments which would be both broad enough to encompass the
needs of all plans and limited enough to ensure a prudent portfolio.
II. Arguments for Reform
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA) ' 0 7 restructured the regulation of private pension plans. ERISA
sought to establish a coordinated federal regulatory framework to
99. Id. at 194-95.
100. Approximately 10% of the public pension plans in a recent Congressional
study were prohibited from investing in common stock. In 60% of the surveyed plans,
common stock investment was limited to 35% or less, and only 7% of the surveyed plans
were completely free of restrictions regarding investment in common stock. TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 132. See also L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 29.
101. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 194. See also Campbell &Josephson, supra
note 13, at 53 ("Ironically, the original purpose of the legal list was to liberalize the
scope of investments the trustee could consider."); Murphy, supra note 4, at 238 n.102.
102. Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 54 (trustees must exercise duty of care
and skill in choosing among authorized investments).
103. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 115-16; Murphy, supra note 4, at
236 ("mandated investment restrictions . . . produce inherent inefficiencies and poor
investment results").
104. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. These problems have led some
states to drop or expand legal list statutes. See Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at
115 n.384.
105. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
106. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.




achieve increased retirement security for the private sector labor
force.' 08 Prior to the passage of ERISA, private plans were subject
only to state and local regulations which often failed to insure in-
vestment security.' 09 ERISA enacted a coordinated set of regula-
tions which establish fiduciary, funding, reporting and disclosure
standards for private plans. I t0
When ERISA was drafted, public pension plans were covered by
its proposals."'t Public plans were subsequently removed from ER-
ISA's scope because of both a lack of information about public plans
and doubts about the constitutional validity of federal regulation of
state and local funds." 2 ERISA did, however, mandate an extensive
study of the viability of public plans and the possible need for future
federal regulation." 3 This comprehensive study of public plans, the
first of its kind, determined that serious deficiencies existed at all
levels of public plans in reporting, disclosure, funding and fiduciary
responsibilities. 1 4 It concluded that federal regulation was both
constitutionally permissible" 5 and institutionally desirable." 1 6 This
section of the Comment will further consider both of these
conclusions.
A. Constitutionality
The primary constitutional basis of federal regulation of public
funds is the Commerce Clause. 1 7 Congress, pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause, is given the power to regulate interstate commerce.
To determine whether an activity involves interstate commerce, a
simple test is applied: ". . .whether the activity sought to be regu-
lated is 'Commerce which concerns more states than one' and has a
108. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE EMPLOYEE RE-
TIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 28 (Senate Print 98-221
1984) [hereinafter cited as THE FIRST DECADE].
109. Id. at 27 (although some federal regulation did exist prior to ERISA in tax,
labor, and criminal law, both the specific federal regulations and the more general state
regulations were generally viewed as ineffective).
110. Id. at 28.
111. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (state-
ment of Alicia H. Munnel, Vice President and Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston).
112. Id. See also Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 66-67; Fiscal Distress, supra
note 13, at 992 n.3, 1017.
113. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 3031. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
114. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-5.
115. Id. at 17-22.
116. Id. at 49.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
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real and substantial relation to the national interest." ' " 8
Applying this test to public pension funds, it is clear that the regu-
lation of public funds falls within the Commerce Clause power. As
stated by the 1978 Congressional Task Force Report on public
funds:
Given the tremendous impact public employee retirement systems
have on the securities markets and the national economy, the frequent
movement between various states of public plan participants, and nu-
merous other factors all demonstrating that public employee retire-
ment systems involve more than the state in which the plan is located,
it is clear that public plans involve interstate commerce, and hence
may be regulated by Congress under its Commerce Clause.' 19
The extent of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, however, may
be limited by federalism concerns. At the time this study was made,
National League of Cities v. Usery 120 articulated the prevailing constitu-
tional standard for determining those powers reserved by the Con-
stitution exclusively to the states. National League of Cities held that
the Constitution did not empower Congress to regulate in "areas of
traditional governmental functions."' 21 Many legislators thought
that public fund regulation was the sort of "traditional government
function" reserved exclusively to the states. 22 Whatever the valid-
ity of this conclusion at the time, the issue of the legitimacy of fed-
eral public fund regulation under National League of Cities is purely an
academic question today. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, t2 3 the Court overruled National League of Cities, holding that
the states' continued role in the federal system is guaranteed by the
structure of the federal government itself rather than by any exter-
nally imposed limits on the Commerce power.
Under this process notion of federalism, "Any substantive re-
straint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its
justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it
must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state
autonomy.' "124 The procedural focus of the Garcia standard re-
118. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
119. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
120. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
121. Id. at 852.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 1139, 98th Cong., 2d Sess 85 (1984) (dissenting views of
Hon. Steve Bartlett); Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Alicia H. Munnel, Vice
President and Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston); State Groups Oppose ERISA
Legislation, TAx NoTES April 5, 1982 at 95.
123. 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).




quires a determination that the "internal safeguards of the political
process have performed as intended."' 2 5 There can be no question
that this is the case with respect to the current proposal for federal
regulation of public pension plans. Congress has been considering
the desirability of such regulation for over ten years. Extensive
studies and hearings have been conducted by Congress at which
representatives of the states were encouraged to voice their protests
to such regulation. 26 Congressional approval would, therefore,
mark the final step in an ongoing and regular national political
process.
The constitutional validity of the proposed federal pension fund
regulation is further demonstrated by the fact that it is less intrusive
on state sovereignty than the minimum wage requirements ap-
proved by Garcia. In Garcia, the Court held that a local public transit
authority was not immune from the minimum wage and overtime
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act because there was
nothing in those requirements that was "destructive of state sover-
eignty or violative of any constitutional provision."' 27 In so hold-
ing, the Court reasoned that the wage standards imposed on state
employers were no more extensive than those required of private
firms.' 28 The Court looked to the fact that the federal government
provides financial assistance to state and local mass transit systems
to further rationalize the expense imposed on the states by the mini-
mum wage requirements.1
2 9
Similarly, the federal regulation of public pension funds proposed
by this Comment is less extensive than that applied to private plans
by ERISA. i30 The only expense to the states may be an increase in
administrative costs.' 3 1 These expenses can be justified by the fact
that the federal government provides assistance to public plans by
125. Id. at 1020.
126. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; Hearings, supra note 3, at 3
(statement of Hon. Kiliean Townsend, Georgia State Representative on behalf of the
National Conference of State Legislators).
127. 105 S.Ct. at 1020.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See H.R. REP. No. 1139, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1984). Neither this Comment
nor PEPPRA addresses the funding problems which plague public plans. This would be
the most fertile ground for constitutional objection. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
2, at 19. However, under the standard articulated in Garcia, federal regulation of the
funding of public plans would seemingly be constitutional.
131. It is not clear that the proposed federal regulation would be more costly than
the regulatory schemes already in place in most states. See supra note 71 and accompany-
ing text.
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exempting them from federal income tax assessments.' 32 For these
reasons, federal regulation of public pension plans would be consti-
tutionally permissible under the Garcia standard.
B. Institutional Desirability
The primary question considered by this Comment is the desira-
bility of federal regulation of public plan trustees. This section ad-
dresses two issues. First, is any regulation of public fund trustees
necessary? Second, if some regulation is desirable, why is the fed-
eral, rather than the state, government the appropriate regulator?
1. The Need for Regulation
Participants in pension plans have an interest in the proceeds
from fund assets which is akin to ownership.133 This is true for pub-
lic as well as private employees. The management and control of
fund assets, however, is vested in trustees whose interest in fund
proceeds is slight when compared with the gains they could appro-
priate by diverting fund assets to their personal or professional
use.' 34 An incentive structure, either market or regulatory, is thus
necessary to ensure that such diversion does not occur.'3 5
In the context of the modern corporation three mechanisms exist
for aligning the interests of the corporation's owners, its sharehold-
ers, with those of its managers: the market for managerial expertise,
the market for corporate control, and formal voting require-
ments.' 3 6 Common stockholders own claims on the corporation
which are freely alienable. 137 An efficient market exists to value
their claims at a low cost;' 3 8 the value of a claim reflects investors'
opinions as to the implication of managerial decisions on current
and future cash flows.' 39 This has two results. First, a lower price
will reflect poorly on the manager's skill, thus lowering his ability to
compete for future managerial positions.140 Second, a depressed
132. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
134. See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
135. See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note 1, at 304.
136. See id. at 312-15.
137. See id. at 313.
138. See id. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549 (1984) (discussing efficient capital market hypothesis and mechanisms by
which the market values stocks).
139. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 1, at 313.
140. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
See also Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender




stock price makes a company a likely target in the takeover mar-
ket. 14 1 Managers who wish either to enhance their own marketabil-
ity or to retain control are thus encouraged to maintain stock prices.
Since stock prices are maximized by maximizing returns while mini-
mizing risk, 142 exactly the policy desired by the corporation's own-
ers, both the market for managerial expertise and the market for
corporate control serve to align manager and shareholder interests.
Finally, through their right to approve the membership of the board
of directors, shareholders retain at least a modicum of formal con-
trol over management.14
3
Unlike common shareholders, public pension plan participants re-
main unprotected by market mechanisms. As do common share-
holders, public fund participants own financial interests in whose
management they do not participate. An essential difference be-
tween shareholders and fund participants, however, is that public
fund participants' ownership rights are usually not alienable. There
is no market (much less an efficient market) for pension fund bene-
fits for the simple reason that it is generally impossible to transfer
benefits between individuals. 144 Without a direct mechanism for
pricing pension benefits to reflect the impact of trustee decisions on
risk and return, there cannot exist an external monitoring of trust-
ees analogous to that provided common shareholders through
either the market for managerial expertise or the takeover
market. 145
The possibility remains, however, that pension plan benefits
might be priced indirectly through their effect on the wages public
employers must pay to attract employees. Given a limited labor
force, to the extent public employers compete among themselves
and with the private sector for employees, there should exist a mar-
lenges to Executive Compensation: For The Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 236-38,
272-74 (1983).
141. See Fama &Jensen, supra note 1, at 313.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Vested pension benefits may generally either be transferred or divested upon
termination of employment. See R. TILOVE, supra note 34, at 192-193. Pension benefits
are tied to a particular individual, however, and ordinarily cannot be transferred be-
tween individuals. See also H. RUBIN, PENSIONS AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 9-19 (1965); R. TILOVE, supra note 34 at 20-28 (1959). The same is true for
private pension benefits. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 87-92.
145. All market mechanisms for monitoring corporate managers are tied to stock
price. See Fama &Jensen, supra note 1, at 312-13. If corporate shares were not transfer-
able, market mechanisms would break down. Another means of monitoring corporate
managers involves the use of contract incentives. Such incentives are infeasible for pub-
lic trustees who are either uncompensated or pursue goals which are not easily quantifi-
able. See R. TILOVE, supra note 34, at 215; Murphy, supra note 4, at 246 n.153. See also
Herbert, supra note 4, at 146, 159.
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ket for employees in which competition insures that each employee
receives the maximum compensation package possible. Assuming
that any package can be divided into pension benefits and wages, if
public pension plans are managed inefficiently, public employers
should be forced to offer larger wages to compensate for the reduc-
tion in pension benefits. Under this scenario, the wage level offered
to new employees would reflect the impact of trustee decisions.' 46
A number of factors may explain why such a result has never ob-
tained. First, over the relevant past, there has been significant un-
employment. 47 The supply of labor has, therefore, exceeded
demand. Assuming that a more than adequate number of qualified
employees have existed for public sector jobs, there has been little
incentive for employers to maximize compensation packages. Sec-
ond, workers tend to have optimistic views of management. "They
are taken in by vague assurances of good faith, by legally unenforce-
able promises and by their own hopes for the good life. Tough
minded bargaining in its entirety never occurs--or if it occurs, it
comes too late."' 48 Thus, even if effective competition among em-
ployers were to exist, prospective employees might not demand the
maximum compensation obtainable. Third, until relatively recently,
pensions were considered gratuities rather than part of a compensa-
tion package. 149 Fourth, public employees are not guaranteed the
right to collective bargaining.' 50 Finally, even if present employees
were able to glean information about trustee activity from the com-
pensation offered new employees, they might be unable to act on
the information. Dissatisfied fund participants have little leverage
over their employers because previously earned benefits may be lost
if they carry out their ultimate threat by "voting with their feet" and
leave their jobs.151
146. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 154 (statement of Gerald W. McEntee discussing
tradeoff between wages and pension benefits); Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1010 n.109
(discussing tradeoff between compensation and pension benefits).
147. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 108 (1986).
148. 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 38 (1985). The
dangers of risky investments are not generally perceived by the beneficiaries of the plan.
Although participants often challenge the amount of benefits, they rarely question the
existence of the benefits. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 136.
149. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
150. The National Labor Relations Act guarantees private employees the right to
bargain collectively for pension benefits. Allied Chem. & Alkalai Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157 (1971). Public employees are not covered by the Act. TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 38. For discussions of the effects labor law has on private
plans, see R. Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 CORNELL
L. REV. 911 (1970); R. Goetz, Pension Plans and Labor Law, 1967 U. ILL. L. F. 738; Note,
Employee Pensions in Collective Bargaining, 59 YALE L.J. 678 (1950).
151. Although participants have the option of leaving their employment, exercise of




With respect to formal control of trustees, a public plan's board of
trustees does not represent fund participants in the same way that
the board of directors of a corporation represents the shareholders.
The trustees of public funds are generally appointed by, and answer
to, the political process rather than plan participants. 52 The pro-
tection provided common shareholders by their ability to disap-
prove a board of directors is thus denied public pension fund
participants.
Public pension participants may be represented by union officials,
however. The question remains why the unions have not pushed
either for tougher regulation of public pension fund trustees or for
more efficient management of public pension funds. A number of
factors may explain this phenomenon. Union officials often sit on
pension fund boards as employee representatives.15 3 To the extent
that the interests of union officials diverge from those of plan par-
ticipants, it is in the officials' interest to maintain a loose regulatory
structure. 154 Moreover, to the extent that employees remain uncon-
cerned with pension fund management, 155 union officials will maxi-
mize their popularity with their constituents by concentrating their
efforts on wages when negotiating a compensation package. Finally,
public pension funds are not subject to collective bargaining in
many states.156
The above discussion has made clear that public pension plan
participants currently have no means of adequately monitoring their
trustees. If the interests of plan trustees were no different from
those of plan participants, this would be of little concern. However,
the interests of public pension plan trustees differ from those of
plan participants in a number of important ways. First, the trustee's
ability to expropriate fund assets for her personal gain may result in
harm to fund participants. 157 Absent regulation, for instance, the
Moreover, changing employment may adversely affect even vested rights to pensions.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text. See generally H. RUBIN, supra note 144, at 15-
18.
152. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
153. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 70.
154. For an example of the divergence between union and employee interests, see
Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971). Legislative concern at the time
the National Labor Relations Act was passed centered on union expropriation of pen-
sion funds. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 148. Traditionally, management has cited
union diversion of pension benefits in arguing against union control of pension funds.
Id. at 136.
155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
156. See R. TILOVE, supra note 34, at 353; Murphy, supra note 4, at 214 n.7. Even
where plans are the object of collective bargaining, unions will often allow management
to control the funds. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 134.
157. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 134, at 313 (agency conflict derives from
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trustee could borrow funds from the trust at a lower than market
rate. Because there is no market for pension fund benefits that
would reflect the resulting decrease in fund value, the trustee's ap-
propriation could continue unnoticed, and the participant would
bear the full costs of the trustee's gains.'
58
Second, all fixed-benefit pension plan participants face the prob-
lem that, to a certain extent, the benefits from investments accrue to
the plan sponsor, while the participant bears the risk of large
losses. 159 This inconsistency arises from the nature of fixed benefit
plans which require only that the sponsor pay the amount specified
in the pension plan.' 60 Thus, if the plan earns substantial gains, the
sponsor and not the participant keeps the ensuing benefit.' 6 ' More-
over, if the sponsor makes risky investments that result in large
losses bankrupting the fund, the participant bears the loss. 16 2
managers' tendency to appropriate prerequisites from firm resources for personal
consumption).
158. In the context of the corporation, the value of a firm's stock should reflect man-
agerial expropriation. See id.
159. From the employer's perspective, it would be reasonable to make high risk in-
vestments because participants bear the risk of large losses. From the participant's per-
spective, however, the quality of an investment is a function of returns discounted by risk.
See Herbert, supra note 4, at 138. See also R. TILOVE, supra note 34, at 215.
160. Pension plans may be either defined-benefit or defined-contribution plans. In
defined-benefit plans, the basic benefits to be received are specified in advance. In de-
fined-contribution plans, on the other hand, the participant receives an amount deter-
mined by contributions plus accumulated income and appreciation on the income. See
Langbein & Posner, supra note 26, at 75 n.12 (1980); Note, Fiduciary Standards and the
Prudent Man Rule under the Employment Retirement Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960,
961-62 (1975). See also Herbert, supra note 4, at 131-32 (explaining differences between
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans under ERISA). Defined-benefit plans
may provide for increases in benefits to reflect increases in the cost of living. 82% of
public plans are defined-benefit systems. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 53. See
also Hearings, supra note 3, at 98 (statement of the American Federation of State, County
and Local Employees). In defined-benefit and defined-contribution systems, both, the
employee and the employer may contribute to the plan. Eighty-five percent of public
employees contribute to their pension funds. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 54,
135. Employee contributions, therefore, constitute approximately 40% of the total
funds contributed to public pension funds. Id. at 135. Employee contributions are more
important to public plans than to private systems. Id. at 135.
161. In a defined-benefit plan, favorable market performance redounds solely to the
employer in terms of reduced contributions. See Note, supra note 160, at 977. More-
over, upon termination of the fund the employer may regain whatever surplus remains
as long as it arose out of an "erroneous actuarial computation." See Herbert, supra note
4, at 153.
162. It is often argued that bankruptcy should be of no concern to public plans be-
cause of the state's ability to raise taxes in order to counter investment losses. See, e.g.,
Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1011. However, this argument is flawed in several re-
spects. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 14-15. For example, a majority of public
pension funds are derived from revenues which are limited in some way. See TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 139. Moreover, state employee pensions have to compete with
other state programs for funds. Most states have the right to curtail pension benefits as
well as financing levels when pension costs become too burdensome. Id. at 40. At the
local level, the taxing authority is quite limited. Maximum tax rates set by state law have
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Thus, absent regulation, trustees have an incentive to make risky
investments whose gains accrue to the plan's sponsor while plan
participants shoulder the risk of loss.
Third, employee representive trustees are generally union offi-
cials. Union officials possess distinct interests in maintaining and/or
increasing the power of the union and their position within it
through the manipulation of fund assets.' 63 Moreover, because
union officials essentially owe their allegiance only to those cur-
rently working, they may bargain for increased wages at the expense
of retirement benefits.' 6 4 This harms retirees and those near retire-
ment age.
Finally, state representative trustees' actions are evaluated by a
political market while participants remain motivated solely by eco-
nomic considerations. The nature of the political process, which
judges performance at relatively short intervals, encourages trustees
who are either elected officials or political appointees to pursue a
short term focus of investment yield, maximizing profits over the
short rather than the long run. 165 Plan participants, on the other
hand, would generally prefer investments which earn the highest
rate of return over the long run because they will receive their bene-
fits from the plan only at retirement.166
The political investing problem discussed earlier provides an-
other example of the divergence between responses to political and
economic markets.' 67 To the extent that investment in local assets
benefits the state as a whole, trustees will be encouraged to invest in
local assets, even though the associated risks are higher or the re-
turns lower, to the detriment of plan participants.
It appears, therefore, that the interests of trustees differ materially
from those of plan participants. Given the lack of a market for fund
benefits which could serve to align trustee and participant interests,
regulation becomes necessary to create incentives for public pen-
prevented local plans from achieving adequate financing. Moreover, the state may be
under no legal obligation to guarantee local plans. Id. Over 80% of public plans are
administered at the local level. Id. at 56. This has led some commentators to argue that
effective management of pension funds is especially important in the public sector. See
Murphy, supra note 4, at 212.
163. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (1971) (union trustees placed
substantial assets of pension trust in union-owned bank at no interest and authorized
stock purchase which was primarily for union's benefit).
164. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
154, 173 ("the risk cannot be overlooked that union representatives on occasion might
see fit to bargain for improved wages or other conditions favoring active workers at the
expense of retirees' benefits").
165. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
166. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 138-39; Murphy, supra note 4, at 214-15.
167. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
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sion fund trustees to operate their funds in the interests of plan
participants. 168
2. Federal Regulation vs. State Regulation
Regulation of public pension fund trustees would provide a
needed check on the activities of the trustees which the market fails
to provide. If regulation is to be an effective check, the regulator
should not be the manager of the funds; 69 because individuals act
opportunistically, regulations promulgated by fund managers could
not be expected to limit managerial abuses.' 70
Public pension funds are operated by state and local govern-
ments. State and local government representatives generally act as
the fund trustees. The benefits from mismanagement of fund as-
sets, therefore, accrue either to the government entity itself or to
the trustee, who is generally a government representative. The
states thus have little incentive to promulgate effective regulations
because it is in their interest to enable mismanagement by maintain-
ing as much flexibility as possible for the managers of their vast pub-
lic funds.
Another problem with state regulation is the general hesitancy of
one legislature to commit future governments to a particular system
of pension fund regulation.' 7' The result is a lack of a consistent
policy framework to guide public pension fund trustees. States' lack
of interest in improvement of public fund regulation is exemplified
by the fact that although the current regulatory structure is gener-
ally recognized as ineffective, states have done virtually nothing to
improve their regulations-any small improvements which have
been made have come only in response to the threat of federal
regulation. '
72
The federal government is a superior regulator of public pension
168. See generally Seidman, The Government Corporation: Organization and Controls, 14
PUB. AD. R. 183, 185 ("The single most critical control point is the law, decree, or other
basic authority providing for the creation of a public enterprise.").
169. The role of a regulatory framework should be to create those conditions that
will insure competent management of public funds. Regulations affect the ability and
motivation of an organization to perform effectively. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 237.
170. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 134, at 307 (citing Meckling, Values and the
Choice of the Model of the Individual in the Social Sciences, SCHWEIZERISCHE ZErrsCHRI F FUR
VOLKSWIRTSCHAFr UND STATISTIK (Dec. 1976) as support for fundamental assumption
that individuals ordinarily engage in self-interested, resourceful, evaluative behavior
designed to maximize their own wealth).
171. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 63; Murphy, supra note 4, at 229.
172. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 103 (statement of American Federation of State,




funds for two reasons. First, the federal government does not par-
ticipate in the management of state and local pension funds.'
73
Therefore, Congress does not have the same incentives as state gov-
ernments to promulgate regulation which serves itself at the ex-
pense of plan participants. 7 4 Moreover, federal regulation should,
at least in theory, remain responsive to the needs of both the states
who sponsor the funds and plan participants because both are rep-
resented in Congress. Neither the states nor individual public em-
ployers, however, would generally have sufficient power adversely to
influence a federal regulatory process spanning a large number of
states and employers.
Second, federal regulation permits uniform standards to be im-
posed on a national basis.' 75 Uniform standards will increase both
the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation of public pension fund
trustees' fiduciary responsibilities. 176 Uniformity is particularly im-
portant with respect to reporting and disclosure requirements.
177
173. The federal government does administer pension funds for federal employees.
Although this Comment does not consider federal pension plans, problems similar to
those discussed herein are raised by federal regulation of federal public plans. See Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of the Hon. Kiliaen Townsend, State Representative,
State of Georgia, on behalf of National Conference of State Legislators). See generally
THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 68, at 161-69.
174. One potential objection to federal regulation involves the claim that the federal
government lacks the information necessary to properly regulate public pension funds.
This objection is more valid in the context of private funds, however, because private
plan participants may be more widely dispersed. Private plans are already regulated by
the federal government. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982). It is in the interest of public plans to insure that the federal gov-
ernment has the information necessary for regulation. Moreover, informational
problems are more pertinent in the context of vesting, portability or funding require-
ments, none of which are considered either by this Comment or PEPPRA.
175. This is a general justification given for federal rather than state regulation. See
G. CALEBRESI, COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF STATUTES 74-75 (1982). But see Romano,
Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. OF L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION
225 (1985) (presenting empirical arguments in favor of state regulation of
corporations).
176. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-5 (uniform standard necessary); Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 102 (statement of American Federation of State, County & Munici-
pal Employees) ("Pension experts uniformly agree that the establishment of uniform
fiduciary standards by ERISA has had a major influence on ending pension fund mis-
management."). See also L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 55. The standard imposed by
ERISA and PEPPRA is general; it can, therefore, be interpreted by the federal courts to
meet the needs of individual cases. See Donovan v. Bierwerth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1982).
177. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Alicia H. Munnel, Vice President
and Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston); H.R. REP. No. 1139, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 45 (1984). Current disclosure by public pension funds is inadequate. See TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 79-82. Only a small percentage of public plans could
meet a disclosure requirement similar to that of ERISA. Id. at 76. Lack of disclosure
reflects a failure by public fund trustees in discharging their fiduciary obligations to plan
participants. Id. at 184.
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Uniform reporting and disclosure requirements will assist plan par-
ticipants in more effective monitoring of trustees by enabling com-
parisons between plans.' 78 Unless reports contain essentially the
same data, however, inter-plan comparisons will be difficult, if not
impossible, to make.
Congress's most recent proposal for federal regulation of public
plans, the "Public Employee Pension Plan Reporting and Accounta-
bility Act of 1984" (PEPPRA),' 79 provides an example of a uniform
reporting and disclosure requirement. PEPPRA seeks to provide a
framework for guaranteeing full disclosure, prudent management
and fiscal accountability with respect to public funds.' 80 The pro-
posed Act would give public pension plan participants essentially
the same rights as those guaranteed private pension plan partici-
pants under ERISA by ensuring trustee fiduciary responsibility and
maintaining reporting and disclosure requirements.' 8 ' The poten-
tial benefits from PEPPRA's proposed disclosure requirements are
greatly diminished, however, by a provision which permits states
with substantially similar disclosure requirements to apply their own
standards.' 82 In effect, this allows some state reports to remain
noncomparable, and would increase administrative costs by requir-
ing a determination of whether a state provides substantially similar
disclosure. To facilitate effective monitoring, the proposed regula-
tion should be amended to require compliance with a single federal
standard for reporting and disclosure.'
83
Finally, the need for federal rather than state regulation of public
plans is effectively demonstrated by the abuses which currently
plague public plan administration. 184 The federal government tra-
ditionally has allowed state and local governments to regulate public
178. Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Alicia H. Munnel, Vice President and
Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).
179. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1984); H.R. 5144, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 102 (1984). Two versions of PEPPRA have been proposed to the House of Represent-
atives in two separate bills, H.R. 5143 and H.R. 5144. Both bills are identical in regard
to the matters discussed by this Comment. All references,therefore, will be to H.R.
5143.
180. See H.R. REP. No. 1139, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1984).
181. See Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 64.
182. States are exempted from the federal reporting and disclosure requirements if
a state's governor certifies to the Secretary of Labor that state laws are substantially
equivalent to PEPPRA's requirements. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1984).
183. Hearings, supra note 3, at 26 (statement of the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees).
184. The Hudson County, New Jersey, pension fund was forced into receivership
"largely as a result of abuses in the plan's eligibility and disability provisions." TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 185. Recently, the governor of California vetoed legisla-




funds. This has resulted in a crisis in public plans which threatens
the fiscal stability of state and local governments.'
85
III. Problems Facing Regulators of Public Fund Investment Decisions
This Comment has argued that federal regulation of public plans
is necessary to insure that trustees maximize the returns and mini-
mize the risks of fund investments so that plan participants are guar-
anteed receipt of their earned benefits. This section analyzes one
attempt by Congress at implementing such regulation, PEPPRA.' 86
It suggests that PEPPRA is correct in eliminating specific limitations
on trustee investment choice; trustees must be left free to match risk
and return to the needs of their individual plans. However, by elim-
inating specific investment choice restrictions, not dictating a maxi-
mum risk level, and explicitly authorizing the use of trustees with
clear conflicts of interest, PEPPRA goes too far-in an attempt to




PEPPRA makes important positive changes to current standards
defining public pension fund trustee prudence. PEPPRA relies on a
regulatory structure which first defines the duties of trustees in gen-
eral terms, 88 and then sets forth a number of prohibited transac-
arena. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 98, 104 (statement of the American Federation of
State, Local and Municipal Employees).
185. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 82, 91 (statement of the American Federation of
State, Local and Municipal Employees).
186. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See supra notes 179-181 and accompa-
nying text.
187. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 166 (any regulation must either prohibit conflicts of
interest or impose specific investment restrictions).
188. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 204 (1984) provides that:
[a] fiduciary shall carry out such fiduciary's functions with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(1) for the exclusive purpose of-
(A) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(B) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(2) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims;
(3) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(4) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan inso-
far as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
Act.
219
Yale Law & Policy Review
tions. 18 9  PEPPRA does not define a list of permissible
investments. 190 PEPPRA's general fiduciary standard is identical to
that applied to private plans by ERISA. 19 l PEPPRA, however, is
more lenient than ERISA in defining prohibited transactions.' 92
Thus, public trustees are bound by fewer restrictions with respect to
individual plan investments than are their private sector counter-
parts.' 93 As long as an investment decision meets PEPPRA's pru-
dence requirements, various innovative investment vehicles such as
pooled funds and mortgage-backed securities will be acceptable for
public fund investment.' 94 The same investment by a private fund
trustee would require an administrative exemption. 195 Additional
reforms include PEPPRA's increase in the required level of pru-
dence, limitations on investment in employer-sponsored securities,
and a diversified portfolio requirement.
Current law defines the duties and responsibilities of public fund
trustees in terms of a prudent person or a prudent investor. PEP-
PRA requires that trustees exert the skill that "a prudent person act-
ing in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."' 96
This language appears to establish the standard of an expert inves-
tor of public funds.'
97
PEPPRA also limits the acceptable level of investment in munici-
pal bonds to 5%.198 This is considerably lower than the percentage
allowed by ERISA for private pension investment in assets of the
corporation sponsoring the fund. 199 This distinction is necessary
because of the explicit costs to the public pension fund of carrying
municipal bonds.200 Moreover, any investment by a pension fund,
public or private, in assets of the entity which sponsors it, creates
189. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 206 (1984).
190. For a discussion of why this is a positive change, see supra notes 103-106 and
accompanying text.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
192. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 206 (1984). See also H.R. REP. No. 1139,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1984).
193. H.R. REP. No. 1139, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1984).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 204(a)(2) (1984).
197. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 66. A more stringent fiduciary
obligation should also serve to encourage trustees to seek investment advice or to dele-
gate the investment decision.
198. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 207 (1984).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982).
200. See TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 193 (inherently imprudent for public




real conflicts of interest problems. Because it is not clear that any
such investment should be permitted, the more stringent the restric-
tion the better.20 1
PEPPRA also specifically requires that public pension funds carry
a diversified portfolio of assets. 20 2 This provision will eliminate the
risk of large losses when a single investment or group of invest-
ments is unsuccessful. 203 The question remains, however, whether
individually risky investments are permissible under PEPPRA. ER-
ISA has been interpreted to preclude insistence by a state that the
fund trustee scrutinize the safety of each individual investment
rather than judging the performance of the portfolio as a whole. 20 4
PEPPRA's requirement is identical to ERISA's; thus it is likely that
PEPPRA's standard will be interpreted in the same way as ER-
ISA's. 20 5 Under such an interpretation, trustees would be free to
maximize the value of the portfolio as a whole even at the cost of
investing in an individually risky asset.
Permitting pension funds to make individually risky investments,
however, increases the possibility that trustees will make invest-
ments that provide collateral benefits to themselves either person-
ally or professionally. Because investments are not individually
scrutinized by the legislature or the judiciary, no check on the choice
of investment exists so long as the overall portfolio remains
sound.206 In this way, the trustee's discretion in making investment
decisions is enhanced. 207 Her discretion is further enhanced by
PEPPRA's failure to dictate a maximum risk level for the trust
portfolio.
Different funds have different capacities to bear risk depending on
the nature of their beneficiaries, their size and other factors. 208
201. See Herbert, supra note 4 (considering similar problems in the context of private
plans). Although worded in the negative, this provision could be interpreted to create a
presumption in favor of public funds holding up to 5% of their portfolio in employer-
sponsored securities. However, any investment by public pension funds in employer-
sponsored, tax-exempt securities should be forced to meet PEPPRA's general prudence
and loyalty requirements. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 204, 206 (1984).
202. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 204(a)(3) (1984).
203. See Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 96.
204. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-I(b) (1982). See also Campbell & Josephson, supra
note 13, at 97.
205. Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 65.
206. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 146, 159 (when employer-sponsor manages trust,
application of flexible prudence standards is precluded because effective application of
standard would require scientific measure of risk).
207. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 108.
208. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 239-40 (other characteristics relevant to risk level
include promised benefits, amount of contributions, liquidity demands, actuarial as-
sumptions regarding investment return, employer turnover, age profiles, life expectan-
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Therefore, if a legislature dictates a maximum level of risk, it im-
poses costs on funds which possess the capacity to bear a higher
level of risk. PEPPRA and ERISA have both chosen not to impose a
maximum level of risk. While this allows funds to determine their
own most efficient level of risk, when combined with a lack of spe-
cific investment standards, it could also lead to a regulatory frame-
work without sufficient incentives to deter unscrupulous trustees
from speculation at the cost of plan participants. 20 9 The potential
for trustee abuse in selecting a risk level is great both because the
benefits from increased returns due to increased risk generally ac-
crue to the benefit of the employer rather than the participant,
2 10
and because it is unlikely that the courts will be willing to second
guess the trustee's choice of portfolio risk level except in cases of
flagrant abuse.
211
It is not clear that the drafters of PEPPRA ever considered who
should determine the proper risk level for a particular public pen-
sion fund - Congress or the public pension fund trustee. 212 How-
ever, balancing the costs of instituting a statutory maximum risk
level for public pension funds against the additional safeguard this
guarantees participants, should lead to the conclusion that it is in
the best interest of participants to permit trustees to choose a risk
level appropriate for the particular portfolio in question.2 13 Under
the current system, however, where most public pension fund trust-
cies and salary increases). See also Market Funds, supra note 89, at 32-34; Note, The
Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARV. L. REV. 603, 621-624 (1970).
209. There has been a trend in public pension funds towards more active manage-
ment and more aggressive investment. See T. BLEAKNEY, supra note 6, at 134. Cf. Her-
bert, supra note 4, at 137 (private funds also display trend). For example, Virginia
recently lost $1 million on an investment in an aggressive financial services company
that went bankrupt. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 30.
210. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
211. Risk is ill-defined and difficult to quantify. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 153.
Rarely have fiduciaries been held liable for imprudent investments. Id. at 145. The
business judgment rule, which supposedly holds corporate directors to good faith busi-
ness decisions, provides a useful comparison of an equally rarely applied rule. See W.
FLETCHER, FLETCHER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1039-
1040 at 45-61 (1986). Concerns similar to those involved in corporate cases have led
courts to refrain from second guessing the good faith decisions of pension fund trustees.
See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 48, n.7.
212. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 88 (possibility of dictating risk level is never consid-
ered). See also Fiduciary Standards, supra note 160, at 974-979 (discussing problems
caused by ERISA's failure to dictate risk level).
213. Risk policy formulation for a fund involves consideration of the financial char-
acteristics of the fund and its participants as well as any external limits on risk. See Mur-
phy, supra note 4, at 239. If Congress dictated a maximum risk level it would invariably
be too low for some portfolios, causing those funds' participants to earn less return than
necessary. A better approach might be one similar to that which ERISA and PEPPRA




ees face dual loyalties, the absence of both overall risk limitations
and of individual investment scrutiny leaves participants open to ex-
propriation by public pension fund trustees.2 14 The best solution,
therefore, is to eliminate the conflicts of interest.
B. Eliminating Conflicts of Interest
PEPPRA fails to deal adequately with the problems posed by con-
flicts of interest among public pension fund trustees. 215 PEPPRA
expressly permits representatives of the employer, in this case the
state or local government, to serve as trustees of public pension
plans.216 Because this replicates present state law, it is likely that
current state regulatory systems will remain intact.2 17 Under these
systems, many fund trustees are government representatives. 21
Yet, recent studies of public plans reveal that the potential for con-
flicts of interest resulting from state employees serving as trustees is
a primary problem facing public plans.219 In addition, because Con-
gress explicitly authorized trustees to consider the societal impact of
their investment decision, 220 and because PEPPRA permits public
funds to carry up to 5% of their assets in employer-sponsored se-
curities, 22 1 the proposed legislation expressly allows government
representatives to act upon their conflicts of interest by making po-
litically motivated investments which benefit either the state as a
whole or their own personal political careers at the expense of plan
participants.
Since the use of public officials as public fund trustees creates a
potential for abuse, it should be disallowed unless it conveys special
benefits which cannot be achieved through the appointment of in-
dependent trustees. In this respect, two arguments can be made in
percentage guidelines, rather, fiduciaries are required to diversify to meet the individual
requirements of their funds. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 96.
214. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 166.
215. Conflicts problems are not independent of prudence requirements. While
PEPPRA allows clear conflicts, the prudence requirements it adopts were developed in
situations where the trustee was presumably independent from both the settlor and the
beneficiaries. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 159. Where the trustee and the income bene-
ficiary are the same, the trustee's judgment necessarily reflects his own self interest. Id.
at 166. See also Marshall v. Teamster Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986,
990 n.9 (1978) (citing Fiduciary Standards, supra note 160, at 968 for the proposition that
normal private trust tension between high income and safety does not exist for
pensions).
216. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 208(c)(3) (1984).
217. See Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 65-66.
218. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
219. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-5; L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 9.
220. H.R. REP. No. 1139, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1984).
221. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 207 (1984).
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favor of continuing to permit state representatives to act as public
pension fund trustees. The first argument involves the claim that
state representatives are responsive to the will of the people, either
directly or indirectly, through the electoral process.22 2 This, how-
ever, is precisely the problem. Because they are politically account-
able, public officials may act as if their duty lay with the state or
locality as a whole, rather than solely with fund participants. This
violates a trustee's duty to act exclusively to benefit participants. 223
The political process does provide plan participants with a means of
ousting ineffective or dishonest trustees. However, public employ-
ees often comprise only a small part of the relevant population and,
therefore, would presumably not have the power to vote trustees
out of office. 224 Moreover, because the rest of the population may
benefit from questionable practices such as local investment en-
gaged in by public pension trustees, they might not support public
employees at the ballot box. In addition, by the time the detrimen-
tal effects of poor trust fund management are felt, that is, at retire-
ment, the trustees who caused the problem may have left public
office.
22 5
Thus, the reputational effects of mismanagement by government
officials may not influence the political processes by which they are
chosen as fund trustees. One solution to this problem might be a
reform of the political selection process so that trustees undergo
periodic approval by pension participants themselves, rather than by
the population as a whole.2 26
The second argument in favor of allowing state representatives to
act as public pension fund trustees involves the claim that because
222. A recent Peat, Marwick and Mitchell Report on the Minnesota State Board of
Investment supports board membership of state constitutional officers as elected repre-
sentatives of the taxpayers who ultimately support the plan. See Murphy, supra note 4, at
231 n.81. See also Fiscal Distress, supra note 13, at 1016 n.132 (noting argument thatjudi-
cial protection is unnecessary because participants exercise considerable political
power).
223. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 204 (1984).
224. Public employees average 10% of the population. See Hearings, supra note 3, at
14 (statement of the Hon. Kiliean Townsend, State Representative, State of Georgia, on
behalf of National Conference of State Legislatures).
225. This problem stems from the fact that most political appointments are on an ex
officio basis. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 67. One commentator has con-
cluded that elected officials should not be permitted to act as trustees. See Murphy, supra
note 4, at 253. The Ohio Attorney General has interpreted his state's enabling legisla-
tion for transit authority pensions as prohibiting elected officials from serving as fund
trustees. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 253 n.182. See also L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at
55.
226. But see Murphy, supra note 4, at 255-56 (rejecting direct election of pension plan




the state or locality is sponsoring the plan, the state should have a
right to help determine how the plan is managed.2 27 While it cannot
be contested that the state must retain some control over certain
aspects of fund management, decisions regarding investment of
fund assets arguably should remain free of state control. Some deci-
sions, such as the method of funding benefits, directly affect the fis-
cal stability of state and local governments. 228 State representatives
should be permitted to participate in these aspects of fund manage-
ment. However, once assets are transferred to a public fund, the
state's interest in the daily management of those assets is greatly
reduced because the assets have essentially become the property of
the employees.2 29 Of course, if fund assets are so poorly invested as
substantially to increase the cost to the state or locality of funding
the plan, then the state would have a legitimate complaint. The
question is how to balance these conflicting concerns, that is, how
best to protect both the interest of the state as sponsor and the in-
terest of employees as beneficiaries.
One answer might be to amend PEPPRA by deleting the provision
specifically permitting state representatives to act as pension fund
trustees. Such an amendment would not necessarily mean that state
representatives could never act as trustees; rather, it would mean
that their actions as trustees would .be analyzed under the general
requirement of PEPPRA that they act "solely to benefit" fund par-
ticipants and refrain from self-dealing transactions. 230 Strict appli-
cation of PEPPRA's fiduciary requirements would force trustees
more seriously to consider participant interests before acting and
might have the additional benefit of discouraging state representa-
tives from participating in fund investment decisions.
227. See L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 55 ("State and municipal governments and
their taxpayers have an equal stake.").
228. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 144-79; R. TiLOVE, supra note
34, at 131-73.
229. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. But see L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at
55 (arguing that state representatives must be permitted to participate in investment
decisions).
230. Elimination of the provision in PEPPRA which explicitly permits employee rep-
resentatives to act as fund trustees would mean that these are no longer "authorized"
conflicts. Transactions involving authorized conflicts are merely subject to a rule of
good faith. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; Withers v. Teachers Retirement
System, 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Campbell &Josephson, supra note 13, at 73-
80 (discussing authorized conflicts). However, strict application of the general fiduciary
requirements of PEPPRA in conjunction with the prohibited transactions rule would
effectively bar state representatives from participating in most investment decisions. See
H.R. 5134, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 204, 206 (1984). See also Campbell & Josephson,
supra note 13, at 79. If the exclusive benefit rule is to have any substance, it should be
interpreted to require an independent trustee. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 160.
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State representatives concerned with their ability to comply with
PEPPRA's fiduciary standards, yet desirous of retaining control over
public plans, could delegate investment decisions to an independent
investment board with expertise in the management of fund assets,
while retaining their own seats on the board of trustees.2 31 Under
traditional trust law, a trustee is not permitted to delegate the re-
sponsibility for investment choice.232 This rule has been generally
applied to public pension fund trustees.233 Thus, the trustee has
been unable to rely on the advice of othersin scrutinizing invest-
ment decisions.2 34 PEPPRA, on the other hand, specifically allows
the public fund trustee to delegate his investment decision. 23 5 PEP-
PRA holds the investment manager to the same fiduciary duty as it
does trustees.23 6 Delegation of the investment decision, therefore,
would shield participants from potential investment conflicts caused
by either state representatives or union officials serving as trustees,
yet would allow such trustees to retain influence over non-invest-
ment decisions affecting their interests. This would serve to protect
participants and at the same time recognize the legitimate interest of
the state as sponsor.
Conclusion
Current regulation fails to protect public plan participants from
trustee misconduct. Plan participants also have limited market
mechanisms enabling self-monitoring of trustee investment deci-
sions. States have not acted to correct the situation, and an analysis
of state interests in continued trustee flexibility suggests that state
231. Investment boards provide an effective means of insulating the investment de-
cision from political pressures. See T. BLEAKNEY, supra note 6, at 145. Under a corporate
structure, administration of benefits should be separated from investment decisions. See
Hearings, supra note 3, at 73 (statement of Suzanne Taylor, Connecticut Education Asso-
ciation). Most public pension funds are set up as public corporations. See Murphy, supra
note 4, at 228. However, only 2.1% of public plans have a separate investment board.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 189. The board should confer broad power and
autonomy on those authorized to invest its assets. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 243. See
also id. at 221-22 (arguing for use of multiple outside investment managers to encourage
intrafund competition). See generally L. KOHLMEIER, supra note 4, at 18.
232. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at § 171.
233. See, e.g., Withers v. Teachers Retirement System, 441 F.Supp. 1248, 1254-1255;
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 189; Campbell & Josephson, supra note 13, at 103-
04.
234. Id.
235. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(c) (1984).
236. H.R. 5143, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(13) (1984). Such a broad definition would
likely impose fiduciary responsibilities on numerous persons who would not be consid-





action should not be expected. For these reasons, federal regula-
tion of public plan trustee investment decisions is necessary.
Congress has proposed one attempt at such regulation in the
form of PEPPRA. PEPPRA recognizes the financial concerns which
must underly regulation, but its response is insufficient. PEPPRA
eliminates restrictions on investment choice and does not fall into
the trap of compensating with an externally imposed maximum risk
level. However, PEPPRA fails adequately to counter trustees' in-
creased flexibility with more stringent fiduciary obligations and con-
tinues to authorize the use of trustees with clear conflicts of interest.
Though PEPPRA is a first step toward protecting public plan par-
ticipants, it does not go far enough. Federal regulation, if it truly
desires to protect public plan participants from trustee misconduct,
must bar trustees with clear conflicts of interest. If state interests
demand participation in public plan management, at the least, state
representatives must be required to delegate investment decisions
to independent investment counselors bound by strict fiduciary obli-
gations to plan participants.
-Kathleen Paisley
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